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Abstract
This paper discusses the benefits as well as the adjustment problems resulting
from the proposed accession of the member countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In the area
of trade-related policies, the CIS countries will have to make strategic decisions
on policy objectives that have so far been avoided. Necessary adjustments to
specific policy instruments will be limited and mostly technical in nature.
Similarly, current plans for regional integration among CIS countries are
fundamentally in compliance with WTO rules. However, negotiating strategies
should be carefully coordinated among CIS countries that are in a de facto,
though not necessarily a de jure customs union. Systemic transformation,
especially the imposition and further strengthening of financial discipline on
formerly socialist enterprises through privatization and elimination of subsidies,
will need to be carried forward vigorously. Benefits of WTO accession include
the consolidation of recent improvements in market access and, above all else,
greater credibility for market-oriented reform policies through the international
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1 Introduction
In 1992 and 1993, most member countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) applied for membership in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
1 With the change from the 'old' GATT 1947 to the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, these applications are now
considered to be for membership in the WTO. Thus the CIS countries find
themselves among the last major trading countries to join the WTO, a group that
also includes China, Taiwan, Saudi-Arabia, and Vietnam.
This paper analyses the benefits and the adjustment issues involved in the
accession of the CIS countries to the WTO. The paper focuses on Russia,
Ukraine, and Belarus which are the largest CIS economies and whose
negotiations on accession (together with those of Armenia) are the most
advanced. These three countries have submitted memoranda on their trade-
related policies, and are now at different stages of answering successive rounds
of questions from members of their Accession Working Parties and conducting
By January 1997, only Azcrbeidshan, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan had not applied for
GATT/WTO membership (WTO internet page
<http://www.wto.org/wto/memtab2_wpf.htm!.> as of 22 January 1997).bilateral and multilateral talks on trade concessions. In spite of the narrow focus
of this paper on only three but of twelve CIS countries, it is expected that both
the benefits and the adjustment problems involved in acceding to the WTO are
broadly similar for Moldova and for the more advanced Transcaucasian and
Central Asian economies. Certain adjustment issues, such as in the area of
subsidy reduction, may be less urgent for some of the less advanced CIS
economies if these qualify to enter the WTO as developing countries.
From the point of view of the CIS countries, their accession to the WTO would
represent an important step in their systemic transformation into market
economies. By subjecting their trade-related policies to the scrutiny of their
trading partners and by undertaking binding liberalisation commitments, the
CIS countries would enhance the credibility of their market-oriented reforms.
WTO membership would represent the institutional side of their integration into
the international division of labour after several decades of self-imposed
isolation. In addition, many improvements in market access in OECD countries
would become permanent which, so far, have only been accorded to CIS
countries on a provisional basis. Furthermore, from the point of view of the
WTO, the accession of the CIS countries would strengthen the multilateral
trading system against the background of moves towards regional economic
integration in many parts of the world.5
Along with the potential benefits, the accession of CIS countries to the WTO
involves formidable adjustment problems that arise mainly from three sources.
First, when the CIS countries were still member republics of the former Soviet
Union, they had no foreign trade policies of their own. Because of their only
recent independence, the institutional framework is still quite weak in many
policy areas affected by WTO rules, including the trade regime, financial sector
regulation, and monetary and exchange rate policies. Frequently, strategic
policy objectives are not completely defined. Furthermore, the legal frameworks
in CIS member countries are not fully developed in some areas that have been
brought into the scope of the multilateral trading system through the WTO
agreements, such as services and intellectual property rights.
Second, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union proceeded in an
unplanned and, at times, haphazard fashion. Therefore, it took several years for
new market-type institutions to be formed for the conduct of trade among the
CIS countries, e.g. contractual relationships directly between enterprises, a
functioning payments system, national currencies, currency exchanges. Against
this background, moves towards regional integration among CTS countries,
which were motivated by a variety of political and economic considerations andtook place at the bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral levels, frequently lacked
consistency and transparency.
Third, WTO rules assume the existence of an economic system based largely on
market transactions among economic agents. In a state-dominated economy,
fulfilment of many membership obligations would be difficult, if not
impossible, to implement and verify. However, market-oriented reforms in
many CIS countries are far from complete. In practice, of course, present WTO
members show widely varying degrees of state involvement in the economy,
and the difference between a market economy and a centrally planned economy
may ultimately be one of degree. Nevertheless, systemic transformation has
progressed less far in most CIS states than in most transition economies that are
now WTO members (with the possible exception of Mongolia and Bulgaria).
Therefore, further progress in systemic transformation is bound to be an
important topic in negotiations on accession.
While many of the adjustment problems stem from the common Soviet past, it is
important to note that economic policies even the three selected CIS countries,
and more so in the full group of twelve, are becoming increasingly
2 The term plurilateral in this context refers to groups of more than two CIS countries
cooperating through special agreements, rather than through the established CIS
institutions. Cooperation at the latter level is called multilateral.differentiated. This applies to policy areas as varied as subsidies, agricultural
policies, and the role of state-trading enterprises. In treating the accession issues
in the CIS countries as "broadly" similar, this paper takes a bird's eye view for
the benefit of providing a concise overview. A closer look would reveal
considerable divergence at levels of greater detail.
This paper starts with a brief survey of the evolution of the external trade of the
CIS countries since 1992, including a discussion of those features of the central
planning system that continue to affect progress in systemic transformation in
general and the market-oriented restructuring of external trade in particular
(Section 2). The subsequent sections analyse the institutional and policy
changes to which CIS country governments would have to commit themselves
in the course of accession to the WTO (Section 3: trade related policies;
Section 4: regional integration; Section 5: systemic transformation). Section 6
discusses the benefits of WTO accession for the CIS countries in terms of more
secure market access and the lock-in of market-oriented reforms. Section 7
concludes on the implications of the accession of CIS countries for the
multilateral trading system.
2 External Trade of the CIS Countries Since 1992
The former Soviet Union could be characterised as a large, essentially closed
economy. Its relatively small foreign trade was concentrated disproportionatelyon the other centrally planned economies that were members of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The small size of trade with the OECD
countries was not only due to a politically motivated preference for trade among
socialist, rather than with capitalist countries. In addition, on the part of the
OECD countries which would have been the most important trading partners
under market conditions because of their large economic size, many imports
from the centrally planned economies were subject to quantitative restrictions.'
At the same time, OECD exports of many technologically advanced capital
goods were subject to restrictions for strategic reasons (Cocom list).
Since 1991, the politically motivated barriers to East-West trade have been
reduced considerably on both sides. As a result, trade has increased markedly
between countries where barriers have been reduced. A variety of empirical
studies have produced broadly similar estimates of how the regional
composition of the foreign trade of the CIS countries would change once
3 The former Soviet Union was not a member of GATT 1947. However, special rules
allowing quantitative restrictions against exports of centrally planned economies existed
even for those socialist countries like Poland and Hungary that were contracting parties to
GATT 1947 (OECD, 1994; Schultz, 1996).foreign trade is governed fully by market incentives.
4 Gros and Dautrebande
(1992) apply several models to the trade patterns of the CIS countries and
estimate the long-run share of intra-CIS trade in total trade at no more than 25
per cent, irrespective of the chosen model, for the European CIS states, with a
much lower figure for Russia.
5 However, foreign trade statistics from Russia,
Ukraine, and Belarus, even if they are not entirely reliable, show this share still
at more than 50 per cent in Ukraine and more than 60 per cent in Belarus, with
only little reduction over the last few years.
Such studies are based on the observation that, among market economies, there is a stable
relationship between the volume of (bilateral) trade between pairs of countries, on the one
hand, and their gross domestic products and geographic and cultural distance, on the other
(gravity model). This relationship can be used to estimate the regional pattern of trade for
the CIS countries under (hypothetical) market economy conditions.
There are some reasons to suspect that such estimates indicate a lower bound for the future
importance of Belarusian trade with CIS countries, rather than a realistic point estimate.
First, national income in the former centrally planned economies is notoriously difficult to
estimate, and Gros and Dautrebande have used a conservative (i.e. low) figure. In the
simulations, this procedure will lead to similarly low estimates for trade with the CIS
countries. Second, the legacy of the Soviet system - isolation from Western markets, a
common business culture, similar consumer preferences - may well, for an extended
period, exert a stronger influence than factors such as a common language among market
economies. Third, the development of the transport infrastructure may be path dependent
without much effect on the economic appropriacy of the resulting trade; for example,
natural gas will continue to be transported through existing pipelines.10
The very,slow pace of regional restructuring in CIS trade contrasts sharply with
the experience of the more advanced Central and East European transition
economies. In the six largest economies
6 combined, the share of East European
countries in total exports fell from 51 per cent in 1989 to 15 per cent in 1994.
During the same period, the combined share of the 15 EU countries, which are
now the most important trading partners due to their geographic proximity,
increased from 23 per cent to 64 per cent (Piazolo, 1996). With a similar picture
for imports, it may be concluded that it was not external conditions that
prevented a more rapid reorientation of the foreign trade of the CIS countries,
but rather the comparatively slow pace of systemic transformation in the CIS
compared to the Central and East European countries.
7
While the regional composition of CIS trade has thus changed only slowly, its
volume has decreased dramatically.
8 To a large extent, this is due to the collapse
of exports of finished industrial goods. These had been directed mostly to other
centrally planned economies and frequently did not conform to international
standards in terms of quality and price. The decline in aggregate output and
6 Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria.
7 A more detailed discussion of the determinants of trade reorientation may be found in
Kaminski et al. (1996).
8 The best available estimates by Michalopoulos and Tarr (1994) show 1993 trade volumes
at roughly one third of their 1990 levels.11
demand in all European transition economies, coupled with import liberalisation
and increased competition from OECD country firms, reduced CIS
manufactured exports to a fraction of their former volume. In a parallel
development, Russia increased the prices for its energy exports significantly
from their former, artificially low levels. As a consequence, net energy
importers among the CIS countries reduced their import volumes sharply
without, however, finding stable sources of financing the remaining current
account deficits. Both Ukraine and Belarus repeatedly ran up payment arrears
on Russian energy imports and were obliged to request debt rescheduling. Only
to a limited extent were reduced intra-CIS exports of intermediate goods, like
energy materials, steel, non-ferrous metals, basic chemicals, re-directed from
CIS destinations to the world market.
Initially, the decline in trade among the CIS countries was also caused by the
breakdown of the central planning institutions and the absence of market-type
institutions that could have taken their place. Because of the absence of a
functioning payments system in 1992 and 1993, many CIS countries and even
regional administrative units imposed quantitative export barriers in order to
maintain a sufficient supply of scarce goods in the local market or to ensure that
internationally marketable goods were exported in exchange for convertible
currency. However, the institutional framework for trade among the CIS
countries has since improved markedly. By 1994, nearly all CIS states had12
introduced national currencies, most of which were de facto convertible for
current account transactions. A workable system of inter-state payments now
exists through correspondent accounts maintained by commercial banks. It is
therefore unlikely that the absence of trade-supporting institutions in this
narrow sense is still the main cause of the low level of trade.
9
In spite of progress in some areas of systemic transformation, major deficiencies
persist with respect to all three key elements - macroeconomic stabilization,
structural adjustment, and institutional change.
1
0 In the field of macroeconomic
stabilization, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus have all succeeded in reducing
9 The evolution of the policy environment for CIS trade, and particularly the trade and
payments system among the CIS countries since 1992 have been extensively described by
Michalopoulos and Tarr (1994) and IMF (1994).
1
0 A wide variety of sources provide detailed analyses of systemic transformation and
economic developments in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The following sources have been
drawn upon heavily in the preparation of this paper, and readers are encouraged to consult
these for more detailed information and documentation of developments. In English
language, Russian Economic Trends, Ukrainian Economic Trends, and Belarus Economic
Trends, all sponsored by the TACIS program of the European Union, provide detailed
analyses on a quarterly basis with monthly statistical updates. In German language, the
following publications regularly summarise developments in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine,
respectively: DIW/IfW/IWH, Die wirtschaftliche Lage RuBlands; Die wirtschaftliche Lage
der Republik Belarus (both semi-annual); Clement, Hermann et al. (1994;' 1995; 1996).
Foreign trade policy in Russia is documented in greater detail in a recent addition to the
literature: Russia: Foreign Economic Relations. Trends and Prospects. Quarterly Review
(first issue in June 1996)..... K des Irv&i
" mr Wedwirtschrt fej
inflation to moderate or even low levels. However, exchange rate policies have
been erratic. Nominal exchange rates were fixed for extended periods while
domestic inflation exceeded foreign inflation significantly. The resulting
overvaluation of domestic currencies reduced the profitability of export sales
compared with sales in the domestic market." The profitability of exports,
however, is critical for the successful reorientation of exports towards OECD
markets. Firms only will incur high outlays for the setting-up of new marketing
channels if the expected return is sufficiently high (though inevitably
uncertain). Even when central bank interventions in the foreign exchange
market ultimately had to be abandoned because foreign exchange reserves were
depleted, exports were effectively discouraged because fluctuations in the real





1 Export revenues in domestic currency would change little because of the relatively fixed
nominal exchange rate, while both domestic producer prices and production costs in
domestic currency would increase along with domestic inflation.
1
2 In Belarus, throughout the summer of 1996, de facto import restrictions were even imposed
to defend overvalued exchange rates. The highly arbitrary administration of these
quantitative restrictions would have made them inconsistent with the obligations of WTO
membership.14
In the field of structural adjustment, the size structure of enterprises is still
heavily distorted by the legacy of the central planning system. Planners
preferred large enterprises to small ones because the former were easier to set
up and control than an equivalent number of smaller enterprises. Not only was
output large by Western market economy standards; the degree of vertical
integration (value added as a share of the value of output) was also very high
(Liicke, 1994; Langhammer, Liicke, 1995). Enterprise restructuring therefore
requires a decentralization of decision-making, reduced vertical integration, and
ultimately the restructuring of large enterprises into smaller, more flexible units.
Such flexibility and enhanced managerial competence are also crucial for
enabling enterprises to enter new markets which, in turn, is a precondition for
the reorientation of CIS foreign trade.
1
3
Furthermore, the existence of many very large enterprises, each of which
necessarily supplied a large proportion of Soviet demand for a particular good,
led to a sophisticated division of labour among the economic regions of the
former Soviet Union. When some of these regions became independent states in
1991, traditional links between enterprises were interrupted by the new borders.
1
3 The related issues of the commercialisation (change of legal structure) and privatisation of
enterprises (change of ownership and system of corporate governance) are discussed in
greater detail in Section 5.15
Quite generally, but a fortiori under such conditions, the market-oriented
restructuring of enterprises requires a well-functioning legal system that allows
firms to conclude enforceable, inter-firm contracts to replace the former intra-
enterprise transactions. In this area, like in other fields of institution-building,
the process of systemic transformation in the CIS countries is far from
complete.
3 Implications of WTO Accession for the Trade Regimes of CIS
Countries
The problems involved in bringing CIS country trade regimes into compliance
with WTO rules can be related to the strategy for multilateral trade liberalisation
developed by GATT 1947 and further elaborated by the WTO agreements. In
general, WTO rules permit different levels of protection for particular industries
or service sectors across member countries. However, each member is required
to commit to a maximum level of protection for each activity, i.e. to "bind"
import tariffs for goods or market access regulations in service sectors (Art. II
of GATT 1994). Only in closely defined exceptional circumstances may actual
levels of protection be increased above bound levels (for example, in the case of
a sudden increase in imports of a particular good; Art. XIX of GATT 1994 and
Agreement on Safeguards). Given the bound levels of protection, progressive
trade liberalisation is achieved through multilateral negotiations that lead to16
mutually agreed timetables for reductions of protection, for example by given
percentages of bound tariff levels.
In order to verify effective compliance with liberalisation commitments, many
WTO rules seek to ensure the transparency of the trade-related policies of WTO
members. This is rendered difficult by the fact that a wide range of trade or
domestic policy measures, such as export or import tariffs, quantitative
restrictions, taxes on consumption or on production, can be used equivalently to
obtain protection.
1
4 WTO rules therefore define a limited range of policy
instruments (for example, export and import tariffs in the case of trade in
goods), through which protection may be afforded.
1
5
As the CIS countries accede to the WTO, they will have to bring their trade-
related policies into compliance with WTO rules on the use of the various
policy instruments. Furthermore, they will have to define the level and sectoral
1
4 This is the essence of various equivalence theorems, the earliest of which is the Lerner
equivalence of export and import taxes under certain, essentially plausible conditions
(James Anderson, 1994).
1
5 Such rules include a general ban on quantitative restrictions except under exceptional
circumstances (Article XI of GATT 1994), strict definitions of the customs value on which
tariffs are charged (Article VII and Agreement on the Implementation of Article VII of
GATT 1994), upper limits on other charges such as customs user fees (Article VIE),
currency convertibility for current transactions (Article XV), and the provision that
domestic taxes must be neutral as to the origin of the goods taxed (Article 111).17
structure at which they wish to bind their tariffs, subsidies, and market access
regulations. Based on their initial offer, they will negotiate with interested
incumbent WTO members on a definite schedule which would become part of
their protocols of accession to the WTO. The following subsections first discuss
policy adjustment issues and the binding of protection in the case of trade in
goods (3.1 and 3.2, respectively) and then turn to trade in services (3.3) and
other WTO-related issues like intellectual property rights (3.4).
3.1 Necessary Adjustments to Policies Related to Trade in Goods
Trade policies in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus have evolved rapidly since 1992.
Government intervention in foreign trade, which was pervasive initially,
particularly in trade among CIS countries, has been reduced significantly. Many
newly developed policy instruments were designed from the beginning to
comply with GATT/WTO standards. This section describes the status of the
more important policy instruments in the second half of 1996 and discusses the
extent of necessary adaptation to WTO rules, if any. Due to frequent policy
changes, the emphasis will be less on institutional detail than on the broad
issues. This task is facilitated by the fact that current trade-related policies in the
three countries are still essentially similar. This is not unexpected in the case of
Russia and Belarus because Belarus has explicitly pursued a policy of adapting
its trade-related policies to those of Russia as part of a bilateral regional18
integration scheme (see Section 4.2). However, even in Ukraine which has
proceeded rather cautiously in the area of regional integration and policy
harmonization with Russia, the issues raised by WTO accession are essentially
the same.
Import tariffs that are substantially differentiated by product are probably the
most important trade policy instrument in the three countries. Import-weighted
average tariffs are in the order of 15 per cent.
1
6 Most tariffs are ad valorem rates
in the range from 0 to 50 per cent for imports from countries with most-
favoured-nation (MFN) status. Higher rates, sometimes in the order of several
hundred per cent, are applied to a few luxury goods such as vodka. Russia and
Belarus also use specific and combined tariffs, for example on used cars where
customs value (on which an ad valorem tariff would be calculated) would be
difficult to establish. Apart from the MFN import tariff rates, Russia and
Belarus have preferential rates for developing countries at half the MFN level
and zero tariffs for least developed countries.
1
7 Special tariffs at twice the MFN
1
6 This figure is based on various unpublished documents. A more detailed analysis of the
import tariff structure of Belarus (and, therefore, Russia; cf. Section 4.2) in mid-1994 is
found in Lucke (1995). Where similar calculations are available for unweighted averages at
tariff-line level, these do not diverge substantially from the import-weighted averages. This
is because few tariffs are so high as to seriously reduce imports.
1
7 Special and differential treatment for developing countries is covered by the enabling
clause agreed in the Tokyo Round (Gatt, 1994, pp. 53ff.).19
rates are applied to imports from a very few countries with which an MFN
agreement does not exist, and to imports whose country of origin cannot be
established.
1
8 Broadly similar rules are applied in Ukraine; however, the number
of countries benefiting from MFN treatment is smaller, and tariff preferences
for developing countries extend only to agricultural products (Clement etal.,
1994, p. 40). In addition, free trade agreements that provide for tariff
exemptions exist between most CIS states (see Section 4).
In the area of trade remedies, the laws on the customs tariff in all three countries
provide in general terms for safeguard measures, antidumping and
countervailing duties. However, no specific procedures for the imposition of
such measures have been laid down, and no such measure has been applied so
far. It can be expected that detailed regulations, if and when they are written,.
will be designed to comply with WTO rules (especially the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (anti-dumping), the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the Agreement on Safeguards). In
the area of non-tariff import barriers, practically all explicit quantitative
restrictions have been abolished. Import license requirements exist mainly for a
few, potentially hazardous chemical products, and import bans are in force for
1
8 For some time, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.(i.e. Serbia and Montenegro) and
Estonia were the most important cases.20
hazardous wastes that cannot be adequately processed. Some administrative
charges like transit and customs user fees are presently calculated in a way (with
a strong ad valorem element) that does not ensure correspondence between the
services rendered by customs authorities and the amount of the fee. Further
technical adjustments may be required to ensure compliance with the remaining
Uruguay Round agreements on trade in goods, especially the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, and the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VII of GATT 1994 (customs valuation). Here again, new legislation has
typically been designed right from the start to comply with WTO rules, and any
necessary adjustments should not constitute major stumbling blocks.
The application of indirect taxes to foreign trade differs between trade with CIS
countries and trade with the rest of the world. The indirect taxes concerned are
the value added tax (VAT) on most goods (roughly in the order of 25 per cent
with reduced rates for some product-group's) and additional excise taxes on a
more limited number of products. As a general rule, the country-of-origin
principle is applied in trade with CIS countries, i.e. exports to CIS countries are
taxed at the domestic rate but imports from CIS countries are not.'
9 The
1
9 Ukraine appears to be an exception in that it applies the country of destination principle to
indirect taxes on all trade.21
country-of-destination principle is used in trade with the rest of the world, i.e.
exports are exempt from taxes but imports are taxed at the domestic rate. At first
sight, to maintain indirect taxes on imports only from some • countries may
appear to contravene the MFN principle (Article I of GATT 1994). However,
current practice can probably be justified on
i the grounds that tax-exempt
imports are already subject to indirect taxes when exported by the partner CIS
country, and that the application of the country-of-origin principle to indirect
taxation in intra-CIS trade is a consequence of regional integration in general,
and of the abolition of border controls, as between Russia and Belarus, in
particular.
In some cases it has proven difficult to understand on exactly what base VAT
on imported products is calculated. However, such lack of transparency appears
to be a largely technical issue as present procedures do not appear to violate the
national treatment rule of Article III.2 of GATT 1994. This provision is usually
interpreted in the sense that the tax burden must be same for domestic products
on the one hand, and imported products after importation on the other hand.
This is taken to imply that ad valorem taxes like VAT may be calculated on the
customs value of imported products plus customs duty (as currently done in the
CIS countries), although VAT is then paid on the amount of the import tariff
and protection of the domestic product is higher than the nominal import tariff
rate indicates (GATT, 1994, p. 140-141).22
Export taxes exist mainly as specific duties on some raw materials and resource-
intensive products. They are intended to ensure that there is a sufficient supply
of goods to the domestic market when domestic prices are regulated and below
the world market level. The size of export taxes depends on the resource rent
that the state is attempting to capture. Some of the highest rates are for mineral
oil products with ad valorem equivalents of more than 30 per cent. In economic
terms, export taxes could be construed to constitute an implicit subsidy to
domestic downstream industries whose input prices are reduced below the
world market level. However, the definition of subsidies contained in Article 1
of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) does not
cover export taxes, and consequently they should not raise any problems in
WTO accession.
Initially, many export taxes were supplemented by export quotas to ensure that
domestic supply objectives were met. Over time, however, export quotas have
largely been abolished. The remaining export license requirements are
motivated by the protection of scarce natural resources like wild plants with
medicinal uses. In addition to these controls, there are export quota regimes to
ensure the fulfilment of obligations resulting from international agreements,
especially bilateral agreements on textiles and clothing in the framework of the
MFA.23
Export subsidies exist at least in Belarus where the profit tax on profits from
exports in convertible currency is halved and for extended periods VAT was
cancelled on certain exports to Russia.
2
0 Such measures may be justified
economically by the high cost incurred and social benefits created by
enterprises entering non-traditional markets (see Section 2). However, under
Article 29 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM),
export subsidies in transition economies are only allowed for a seven-year
period after the SCM Agreement has entered into force; national schedules for
phasing out the existing subsidy schemes will probably become part of the
protocols of accession of CIS countries.
2
1
After the abolition of most export quotas and the associated license
requirements, Russia and Ukraine sought to maintain a limited measure of
government control over raw material exports in order to prevent tax evasion
2
0 As indirect taxation follows the country of origin principle in trade with CIS countries,
exports from Belarus to Russia would normally be subject to VAT.
2
1 The CIS countries will therefore find it difficult to employ export subsidies for industrial
policy objectives although such a strategy was pursued (with ultimate success) by the
newly industrialising countries in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. Even productions subsidies
could render CIS exports subject to countervailing duties unless subsidies were strictly
focused on enterprise research and development, regional development, or else avoided any
semblance of sectoral targeting (i.e. subsidies would have to be non-specific; see Article 8
of SCM Agreement).24
and dumping. In Russia, certain commodities can only be exported by specially
licensed enterprises that are subject to special surveillance to ensure payment of
export taxes. Since several hundred enterprises of this kind exist, this rule
should not represent a hurdle to exports. Ukraine, since abolishing most export
quotas in 1995, has established a system of indicative prices that are effectively
minimum prices to be observed by exporters.
2
2 Such measures reflect the fact
that during a transition period not all domestic prices are permitted to adjust to
world market levels and soft budget constraints persist in the form of access to
underpriced raw materials. It is clear, however, that such measures would not be
compatible with WTO rules if maintained on a permanent basis.
Turning now from the trade regime to the exchange rate regime, all three
countries have generally moved towards the establishment of de facto current
account convertibility since 1992. This is a crucial success because a multiple
exchange rate regime, for example an official, overvalued rate along with a
black market rate, creates disincentives for exporting and leads to administrative
interference in imports when foreign exchange is allocated to importers at the
official rate. One exception from this favourable trend is Belarus where an
overvalued official exchange rate has been propped up (with varying intensity)
It is unclear how exactly indicative prices are enforced (if at all).25
by arbitrary administrative controls on imports since 1995. In the medium to
long run, accession to the WTO will require the CIS countries to commit
themselves to maintaining full current account convertibility as under
Article VIII of the Statutes of the International Monetary Fund.
The binding and reduction of domestic agricultural subsidies in line with the
Agreement on Agriculture will be difficult to implement. The base level from
which subsidies are to be reduced relates to the years 1986 through 1988
(Annex 3 of Agreement on Agriculture). This is infeasible in the CIS countries
because, in the former Soviet Union, agriculture was subsidized in ways that are
not covered adequately by the Aggregate Measurement of Support as defined in
the Agreement on Agriculture. On the other hand, the conceivable alternative of
using the present subsidy level as a base does not appear feasible either. The
value of subsidies such as directed credit is intrinsically difficult to calculate
and probably fluctuated substantially over the last few years. Nevertheless, it
was probably low compared with many OECD countries, and CIS countries
could therefore legitimately expect to be permitted to increase their agricultural
subsidies temporarily to a somewhat higher level, for example to ease the
systemic transformation in agriculture. Recent demands by major incumbent
WTO members that acceding countries bind very low levels of domestic support
as well as zero export subsidies appear very stringent against the background of
actual OECD country policies.26
Overall, then, while many technical adjustments will be required, there are few
areas where the trade regimes of the three selected CIS countries are
substantially in conflict with WTO rules. Some flexibility will be required of
incumbent WTO members in applying WTO rules whose exact phrasing is
inappropriate for CIS countries.
3.2 Strategies for Binding Levels of Protection
While technical adjustments to the trade regime for goods are extensive but not
especially far-reaching, the CIS countries face a more fundamental problem as
they start negotiations on their tariff schedules and other concessions. Binding
levels of protection for individual economic activities presupposes a strategic
decision as to the underlying objectives of trade policy. Possible choices include
the maximisation of fiscal revenue, which would call for a substantial, but not
excessive average tariff level with limited sectoral or regional differentiation; an
explicit industrial policy which would imply a strongly differentiated import
tariff, but not necessarily a high average level; or regional integration, which
would call for a substantial tariff on extra-regional trade while intra-regional
trade should ideally be free from restrictions.
2
3 As these options are partly
2
3 Langhammer (1994) discusses possible trade policy strategies for CIS countries in greater
detail.27
exclusive, a strategic decision must precede detailed negotiations on
concessions with incumbent WTO members.
So far, none of the three selected CIS countries have taken an explicit or
implicit decision in this respect. As described in Section 3.1, all three countries
have high import tariffs on certain luxury consumption goods such as spirits,
which suggests a fiscal motivation. Russia also has high import tariffs on
passenger cars, while Belarus has failed to apply these fully in spite of the
existing customs union. This suggests that the protectionist demands of
individual interest groups are gaining in practical importance (the automobile
industry is a major employer in Russia but does not exist in Belarus).
2
4 Partly
this may be due to the fact that CIS country currencies have steadily appreciated
in real terms over the last few years, and imports have therefore become more
competitive compared with domestic goods. Similarly, export restrictions have
been used to maintain energy prices below the world market price level which
represents an important subsidy to domestic households and enterprises.
However, an analysis of the full range of protective measures docs not reveal an
explicit industrial policy that discriminates clearly between branches of
2
4 Langhammer (1995) suggests that, in general, large countries tend to be more inclined
towards protectionism because the cost to consumers relative to the benefit to producers
tends to be lower.28
industry; much less are there time limits on the protection currently granted. If
the Southeast Asian approach to industrial policy through trade protection were
to be followed (this is sometimes proposed in the policy debates in the CIS
countries), time limits on protection would be one of its constituent elements
(Rodrik, 1995).
Given this uncertainty, the CIS countries may seek to follow the example of
many developing, countries as well as Slovenia in binding import tariffs at
higher levels than are presently in force. This would leave room for increases in
tariffs at a later stage if considered necessary as part of an industrial or fiscal
policy still to be defined. At the same time, the CIS countries would not feel
compelled to raise actual tariffs before entering the WTO in order to have more
freedom later in choosing their sectoral structures of protection. In the present
situation, the attraction of tariff protection over sector-specific subsidies is that
it causes the cost of protection to be born by consumers, rather than by the
government budget.
2
5 Given the serious budgetary situation in the CIS states,
this traditional second-best argument for industrial policy through the trade
2
5 The impact of protection on exporters may be alleviated through import duty drawback
schemes such as are operational in some CIS countries (under such schemes, import duty is
not charged on inputs into goods that are later exported): However, such schemes normally
extend to import duties only on intermediate inputs and fail to cover investment goods.29
regime may be too strong for the CIS countries to forego its use once and for all
by binding protection at low levels.
The CIS countries would gain some flexibility with respect to the future
conduct of their trade-related policies if they could enter the WTO as
developing countries.
2
6 For example, under Article XVIII of GATT 1994,
developing countries may withdraw previous concessions if there is no
alternative way of implementing policies promoting economic development.
2
7
Transition periods for the implementation of the SCM Agreement are more
generous for less advanced developing than even for transition economies. It
might well be argued that living standards in the CIS countries are broadly
similar to many less-advanced (low-income and lower-middle-income)
2
6 A more exhaustive list of possible advantages of acceding to the WTO as a developing
country is provided by Yang (1996) from the point of view of China, but these
considerations apply equally to the CIS countries.
2
7 Sections A through C of Article XVIII contain provisions for those developing countries
whose economies "can only support low standards of living and (are) in the early stages of




8 that the industrial restructuring and' financing of
supporting policies required in the CIS countries present problems which are
structurally similar to those faced.by many developing'countries in their
industrialization process; and that the CIS countries already benefit from tariff
reductions in most OECD countries under the General System of Preferences
like developing countries. However, major incumbent WTO members have so
far resisted even China acceding to the WTO as a developing country (Yang,
1996). As China's per capita GNP is still below that of Russia and Belarus and
its industrialization has progressed rather less far, the more advanced CIS
countries would probably face even stronger resistance if they aimed to accede
to the WTO as developing countries. Therefore, if they are to remain capable of
using tariffs as instruments of industrial policy, the CIS countries will have to
bind tariffs at sufficiently high levels to have room for adjustments.
2
8 Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus are all classified by the World Bank as lower-middle-income
countries on the basis of their per capita nominal GNP. Compared to the US on a
purchasing-power-parity basis (which is more relevant than nominal GNP for standard of
living comparisons), their per capita GNPs stood at 18 per cent, 10 per cent, and 17 per
cent of the US level in 1994. The corresponding values for other CIS lower-middle-income
economies are 11 per cent for Kazakstan and 9 per cent for Uzbekistan. Low-income
economies among the CIS countries include Armenia (8 per cent), Kyrgyz Republic (7 per
cent), Azerbaijan (6 per cent), and Tajikistan (4 per cent; World Bank, World Development
Report 1996, Table 1). ' ' '31
3.3 Trade in Services
The approach of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to the
liberalisation of trade in services differs somewhat from that of GATT 1994 in
trade in goods. Market access, which is automatic in the case of trade in goods,
is based on specific commitments of each WTO member country for each
service sector. Beyond this, there are general rules on the conduct of national
policies on services trade, for example the MFN principle, a ban on quantitative
limits on the number of service providers, and transparency requirements.
However, members may register far-reaching exceptions even to such
fundamental principles as MFN treatment (Luyten, 1996).
Most problems facing CIS countries in conforming to the rules relate to the
rather underdeveloped state of regulations in most service sectors. There are
currently few explicit policies on privatisation and foreign participation in the
main sectors of interests, i.e. telecommunications and financial services. Since
GATS provisions are not very tight, it should not be difficult for the CIS
countries to conform to these rules. However, clarifications will be required on
many legal issues that for good reasons have so far not been at the centre of
attention of CIS country legislatures. It remains to be seen how far incumbent
WTO member will attempt to push acceding CIS countries to accept32
liberalisation commitments in the more important service sectors, isuch as
telecommunications, financial and professional services, and maritime transport.
Exchange regulations should not pose major problems either. For foreigners -to
establish a commercial presence in the CIS countries, capital imports must be
permitted. While there are some restrictions on capital exports, there are none
on imports. Also, the importation of services through consumption abroad is
hindered when there are limits on the amount of foreign cunency that may be
transferred abroad for certain purposes. Except in Belarus where the state of the
foreign currency market was not very-transparent throughout 1996 (see Section
3.1), there are now few currency restrictions that would impede imports of
services through consumption abroad.
3.4 Other WTO Issues
The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) obliges
members to protect the various intellectual property rights broadly as defined by
the appropriate international conventions, adding provisions especially on
enforcement. Most relevant legislation on intellectual property rights in the CIS
countries has only been written since 1991 because intellectual property rights
in the international sense of the word did not exist under Soviet law. Since all
new laws have been drawn up in close co-operation with the Secretariats of the
international conventions, there are few problems with the conformity of legal33
texts to the TRIPS Agreement. Shortcomings exist, however, in the actual
application and enforcement of these mles because the legal systems as a whole
have not yet been fully transformed. Specifically, national legislation in the CIS,
country does not yet implement fully the border enforcement .provisions of
TRIPS Agreement (Articles 5 Iff.).
Some incumbent WTO members have expressed a strong interest in the CIS
countries joining the (plurilateral) Agreement on Government Procurement. The
CIS countries have generally taken the view that since they would not be
obliged to join under present rules, this technically complex issue should not
have a particularly high priority in the negotiations. It might be worthwhile to
explore whether some fears on the part of incumbent WTO members regarding
persistent state influence in the CIS economies (see Section 5) could be allayed
if the economic behaviour of CIS governments themselves were subjected to the
disciplines of the Agreement on Government Procurement.
At the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in December 1996,
discussions were initiated or continued on a variety of issues that some WTO
members want to bring into the scope of the WTO. These include environmental
and labour standards, rules for the treatment of foreign direct investment, and
international competition policy. Potentially, some of these debates might affect
the CIS countries considerably; for example, CIS exports of intermediate goods34
with high pollution intensity (steel, non-ferrous metals) to OECD countries have
increased in recent years, and might face new barriers if the use of trade policy
instruments for environmental objectives were accepted. While CIS countries
are therefore well-advised to participate actively in these debates as far as their
observer status with the WTO allows, it is too early to predict the outcome of
the discussions or the possible implications for CIS countries.
4 Implications of WTO Accession for Regional Integration Among CIS
Countries
The foundation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the
dissolution in 1991 of the former Soviet Union aimed at creating an institutional
framework for economic relations among CIS countries that could replace the
former central planning system. However, the diverging interests of net energy
exporters and importers, the absence of a functioning monetary system, the
changing role of the state in the CIS economies, and political concerns about
possible dominance by Russia all prevented the emergence of functioning
regional institutions and even of effective regional cooperation. As the CIS
countries are now preparing to join the WTO, it is appropriate to ask what
economic incentives remain for regional integration (Section 4.1), what
institutional implications are involved (Section 4.2), and how the choices are
affected by prospective WTO membership (Section 4.3).35
4.1 Political Economy of Regional Integration Among CIS Countries
Several years into the systemic transformation in the CIS countries, intra-
regional trade still accounts for a large proportion of total trade in nearly all CIS
countries except Russia. This share will probably decline only in the medium to
long run if further dismantling of barriers to East-West trade and continuing
systemic transformation encourage trade especially with Western Europe
(Section 2). Against this background, a regional integration scheme among the
CIS countries offers benefits potentially in three areas. The first applies broadly
to all CIS countries, while the others are more important for the smaller
countries than for Russia.
First, all CIS countries are interested in preventing further disruption in their
traditional trade relationships through new trade barriers. A regional free trade
area or even closer integration in a customs union would provide some
insurance against sudden changes in national trade policies that have frequently
occurred during the last few years and that have caused significant adjustment
costs to firms. In this sense, a regional integration scheme would promote the
openness of national markets, help to maintain a competitive environment, and
prevent the emergence of local monopolies (Hine, 1994). This would apply
especially when not only trade in goods, but also trade in services and the
capital and labour markets were integrated.36
A second motivation for pursuing regional integration is particularly important
from the point of view of net energy importers in the CIS. Russian export prices
for energy materials, particularly natural gas, have increased much faster than
Russian domestic prices. This has not only led to balance of payments problems
for net importing countries, but has also distorted the markets for energy-
intensive products by implicitly subsidizing Russian producers. The abolition of
restrictions on intra-CIS trade, especially the elimination of Russian export
taxes on energy materials, ought to equalize prices across the CIS countries.
When there is price discrimination by the Russian distributor independent of
any Russian export barriers, then regional integration, especially if it went as far
as the economic union planned between Russia and Belarus, could be used to
bring political pressure to bear on the Russian distributor for equal treatment
with Russian consumers.
A third possible motivation for regional integration lies in the enlarged
protected market that would be created for industries in the region. An industrial
policy through trade protection would be infeasible for the smaller CIS
countries because of the small size of their domestic markets; it might be
feasible, however, at the regional level. This raises the question of whether
regional integration should be pursued through a free trade area, where each
member may freely determine its trade policy in relation to extra-regional trade,
or through a customs union with a uniform external trade regime. In a free trade37
area, the protection that an industry enjoys in a partner country against extra-
regional imports is determined by the protection granted by that partner country.
If substantial protection were to be given to specific industries throughout the
region, a customs union with a common external trade policy would be
required. At the same, time, a customs union aiming at regional import
substitution would oblige each member to impose higher output prices for
protected products on its consumers even, in those industries that do not exist,
domestically; this might be politically infeasible, for example, in a large country




Out of a variety of motives including those discussed in the preceding section,
several multilateral agreements on regional economic integration have been
2
9 Furthermore, scepticism is warranted with respect to the use of trade protection for
industrial policy in the CIS countries in general. First, it is not clear how sectors should be
selected for support. Measuring the external effects produced by a sectors, and weighing
them against the cost of protection is intrinsically difficult in stable economic conditions,
and even more so in rapidly transforming economies. Second, by offering protection the
government would become a target for the lobbying efforts of interest groups, and it is
likely that political rather than economic criteria would ultimately dominate decision-
making on industrial policy. The inability of many OECD countries to phase out protection
for largely moribund sectors like coal, basic steel, traditional textiles, and many branches of
agriculture provides a vivid illustration of the effects of lobbying by sectoral interests.38
discussed and signed in the institutional framework of the CIS. The more
important include the Economic Union Treaty of 24 September 1993 which
envisions the creation of a common economic space with free movement of
goods, services, capital, and labour through a staged process, starting with a
multilateral free trade zone and culminating in a monetary union. A first step in
this direction was undertaken by an agreement, signed on 15 April 1994, that
establishes a timetable for the creation of a multilateral free trade area with a
common list of goods exempted from preferential treatment during a transition
period.
However, these as well as some similar agreements have not been implemented,
mainly due to the diversity of interests among CIS member countries.
Cooperation in the framework of the CIS affects not only economic, but also
political and military relations. Smaller, independent-minded countries have
tended to resist what was perceived as Russian attempts to use intra-CIS
cooperation to bring them into a Russian sphere of influence. Such reservations
were reinforced, for example, by Russian proposals for a joint military defence
of the external borders of the CIS countries or for harmonized economic
policies that would inevitably be dominated by Russian interests. On the other
hand, it is difficult to see how Russian interests could not play a large role in
any regional integration scheme among CIS countries because of Russia's sheer
economic size.39
Because of the absence of a functioning multilateral framework, economic
relations among the CIS countries have in fact been regulated mostly by
bilateral agreements. In particular, there is an extensive network of bilateral free
trade agreements which typically provide for free trade between the two
countries concerned and often include a list of products exempted from the free
trade regime. Such exemptions normally relate to commodities that are subject
to export taxes in order to ensure a sufficient supply in the domestic market in
the presence of regulated (maximum) prices.
Until recently, the bilateral free trade agreements were complemented by
intergovernmental agreements that established quotas on deliveries of certain
strategic commodities that would be expected to be compatible with, a bilateral
balance of trade equilibrium. During the early years after the dissolution of the
former Soviet Union, both quantities and prices were set at least for the core
commodities and deliveries were guaranteed by governments, often through
state orders to enterprises or else through procurement procedures. Deliveries of
other commodities were subject to contracts between enterprises, but export
licences would automatically be issued in fulfilment of the agreed quotas. Over
time, the intergovernmental agreements became- less binding; fulfilment ratios40
were erratic and, on average, low.
3
0 Many CIS governments were either unable
or unwilling to enforce state contracts or, as in the case of Russia, abolished the
system of state orders as part of their systemic reform. It appears that for the
1995 and 1996 agreements concluded by Russia and Belarus with various CIS
countries, prices were negotiated by the enterprises concerned, and enterprises
were under no pressure to deliver goods in the framework of the agreements;
nor did they receive special privileges in return for their participation. The main
function of the remaining agreements seems to be to exempt a limited amount of
the intra-CIS trade from export taxes and, where required, from import duties,
Beyond bilateral free trade agreements, some clusters of CIS states have sought
to move towards "plurilateral" regional cooperation. These include the Central
Asian countries and countries bordering on the Black Sea. Other CIS countries,
especially Russia and Belarus, are in the process of developing more advanced
frameworks for regional integration. The spring 1994 treaty on Economic and
Monetary Union between Russia and Belarus provides for a staged approach to
regional integration. The first step that more or less reflected the status quo
consisted in a free trade area in which no taxes of any kind were levied on
bilateral trade. The second step consisted in a de facto customs union which was
3
0 Liicke (1995) surveys the agreements concluded by Belarus in 1994 and 1995 in some
detail.41
created by Belarus effectively copying all Russian foreign trade regulations. As
a result, the customs border between the two countries was abolished in 1995,
which has probably led to a significant reduction in trade costs. Since then,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have stated their intention to join the Russia-
Belarus customs union.
However, the present arrangements between Russia and Belarus raise several
questions as to their sustainability. First, there is no formal division of tariff
revenues. In practice, when goods are brought into Belarus, customs
declarations must indicate their final destination (Belarus or transit to Russia);
tariff revenue is then allocated accordingly. This system is presently
undermined by extensive tariff exemptions granted independently by both sides
to supposedly charitable organizations that import large amounts of spirits,
among other things, duty-free and resell them throughout Russia and Belarus.
Second, there are no joint institutions but each country formally retains its
sovereignty over the trade regime. This has been feasible so far because Russian
import tariffs, which Belarus copied, tended to be low and conflicts of interest
did not arise. In the medium term, however, industrial interests will probably
gain greater influence over Russian trade policy. Since specialization patterns in
Belarusian industry are highly selective, the industrial policy priorities of42
Belarus will probably differ from those of Russia and will therefore be
impossible to pursue through a common external trade policy.
3
1 Third, Belarus
had hoped to have its import prices for energy reduced to the lower level in the
Russian domestic market. It is difficult to understand why energy prices are still
higher in Belarus than in Russia. While transport costs may play a limited role,
a more likely explanation is monopolistic practices by Gazprom and other
Russian state enterprises, or continuing price controls in Russia which are not
applied to inter-state trade. It remains to be seen whether the Russian
government is really willing to extend the benefit of heavily subsidized energy
prices to Belarus, and whether it is in a position to put sufficient pressure on
energy exporters if required.
4.3 WTO Implications
As regards the substantial provisions for regional integration schemes,
Article XXIV of GATT 1994 states that, after a transition period, substantially
all trade originating in the member countries must be free from tariffs and other
trade barriers. Judging from current intentions as well as current practice, this
condition could probably be fulfilled by the existing or planned bilateral or
3
1 Belarus already applies lower tariffs on imported passenger cars than does Russia, on
account of the fact that there is no car industry in Belarus while there is one in Russia.43
multilateral integration schemes. The use of export taxes to protect domestic
consumers of a limited number of commodities could probably be justified if
there were a timetable for their gradual reduction and eventual abolition. CIS
countries should therefore experience few substantial problems in adjusting
existing or planned customs unions or free trade areas to WTO rules upon
accession.
However, the present, less than transparent state of regional integration among
CIS countries with a mixture of multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral
agreements raises two procedural issues. First, Article XXIV, para. 5 of
GATT 1994 states that customs unions or free trade areas may be created that
comprise the territories of WTO members. This provision could appear to raise
a problem if not all CIS countries join the WTO at the same time, as seems
likely, and there exist integration schemes involving simultaneously members
and non-members. However, although the wording of Article XXIV, para. 5 is
straightforward, it appears that regional integration schemes involving both
GATT 1947 contracting parties and non-contracting parties have been approved
under this provision, rather than under the more appropriate Article XXIV,
para. 10 which would require approval by a two-thirds majority (of GATT 1947
contracting parties or WTO members; GATT, 1994, pp..742f. and 770f.). As
WTO accession requires approval of the terms of accession by a two-thirds
majority of WTO members anyway (Article XII of WTO Agreement), the44
difference between para. 5 and para. 10 of Article XXJV of GATT 1994 will be
of little practical consequence for acceding CIS countries.
A second procedural issue is raised by the de facto customs union between
Russia and Belarus which may be joined by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Under
the terms of Article XII of the WTO Agreement, countries can only accede to
the WTO if they possess full autonomy in the conduct of their external
commercial relations as well as other policies affected by the multilateral
agreements. Formally, so far, Belarus copies the Russian trade regime without
giving up its sovereignty over trade-related policies. Even if a similar
arrangement were chosen by the new members of the customs union, close
cooperation in accession negotiations on all matters covered by the de facto
customs union would be desirable. For example, it would make little sense for
the smaller countries to negotiate their import tariff schedules independently of
Russia. If a full-fledged customs union with joint institutions is eventually
implemented, these joint institutions should lead negotiations on those policy
areas for which they are responsible, with national governments coming in for
all areas not covered by the customs union agreement. In sum, the present
strategy of each CIS country negotiating individually on WTO accession needs
to be supplemented, at least, by close cooperation with respect to those policy
areas that are covered by regional integration agreements.45
Many bilateral and multilateral agreements among CIS countries go beyond
trade in goods and provide for some regional integration in trade in services.
This does not appear to raise substantial difficulties under WTO rules. Article V
of the GATS aims at permitting regional integration agreements only with
substantial sectoral coverage in terms of the numbers of sectors, volume of trade
affected, and modes of supply (Footnote 1). However, these provisions appear
rather weak and probably would be met in a reasonable fashion by existing or
future agreements among CIS countries, judging from current intentions.
5 Implications of WTO Accession for the Role of the State in the
Economy
The WTO agreements implicitly assume that contracting parties are market
economies where state involvement is ideally limited to the production of public
goods and corrective action for market failures. This assumption is clearly not
satisfied in the CIS countries where systemic transformation is far from
complete. On the other hand, systemic transformation, integration into the
international division of labour, and integration into the multilateral trading
system are closely intertwined. Therefore, it would be a major setback for the
CIS countries if their accession to the WTO were to be postponed until systemic
transformation is more or less complete. This section starts by surveying the
possible concerns of trading partners, referring back to the position of centrally46
planned economies under GATT 1947. Subsequently, progress in reducing the
economic role of the state in the CIS countries is discussed and implications for
WTO accession during the transition period are derived.
Direct state involvement in the production or distribution of tradeable goods,
which exists widely even in established market economies, is dealt with in
Article XVII of GATT 1994 which defines state trading enterprises by the
existence of exclusive or special rights or privileges, rather than ownership. It
also states that the activities of state trading enterprises may create obstacles to
the expansion to trade, and that such obstacles should be removed through
negotiations on the basis of reciprocity and in a mutually beneficial manner.
Because of concerns about pervasive state trading, centrally planned economies
acceding to GATT 1947 were required to accept special commitments on
increasing their imports from GATT contracting parties (for example, Poland
and Rumania in the 1960s and 1970s; Schultz, 1996). At the same time, the
exports of GATT 1947 members with centrally planned economies were subject
to the imposition of anti-dumping duties under less restrictive conditions than if
they had originated in market economies.
A large economic role of the state may undermine the rights of trading partners
in several ways, and verification of violations may be difficult. On the import
side, state-dominated enterprises may discriminate among sources of supply on47
other than commercial grounds and thereby undermine the most-favoured-
nation principle (Article I of GATT 1994). Further, they may apply (prohibited)
quantitative import restrictions (Article XI), or introduce markups that exceed
the level at which the country in question has formally bound its import tariffs.
On the export side, there is a suspicion that countries where the state plays a
large role in the economy have a greater tendency than market economies to
subsidize industries in non-transparent ways. Thus the focus is on the possible
granting of prohibited or actionable subsidies in connection with state trading.
3
2
As it is the stated intention of the transition countries, including the CIS states,
to transform their economies into market systems, special rules like those for
centrally planned economies are no longer appropriate to ensure implementation
of trade concessions. Further progress in privatization and stricter enforcement
of market principles in all transactions (culminating in the implementation of
bankruptcy procedures for economically non-viable enterprises) should go a
long way towards ensuring that CIS country enterprises choose among suppliers
on none but commercial grounds. As regards CIS exports, the GATT 1947 rules
on subsidies have been tightened considerably in the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, and have been made compulsory for all WTO
See Low (1994) for a detailed discussion.48
members. Acceptance of these rules by the transition economies should reduce
distortionary intervention by the state and subsidization of production and
exports along with the resulting incentives for dumping on the part of
enterprises.
At present, however, state involvement in the CIS economies still extends to
several areas where it cannot be justified fully as production of public goods or
corrective action for market failure. While progress in reducing the economic
role of the state has been achieved in some CIS countries and in certain policy
areas, stagnation (or worse) is found elsewhere. Furthermore, the economic
impact of government involvement is not fully accounted for by a list of
institutional arrangements and direct or indirect subsidies that do not comply
with market economy principles. Rather, many subsidies are granted in a way
that results in the absence of financial discipline or "soft budget constraints"
(Kornai) on the part of enterprises. Government interference and subsidies thus
lead not only to a different incentive structure for production and consumption,
but also to a mode of enterprise behaviour that is incompatible with market
economy principles.
Soft budget constraints were a pervasive feature of the centrally planned
economy. They arise when the costs incurred by an enterprise may exceed its
revenue even in the medium to long run without the enterprise being forced to49
improve its performance or go out of business. Managerial decisions in such
enterprises are unlikely to be determined solely by market incentives, and WTO
rules may not achieve their purposes in this context. Crucially, in the case of
soft budget constraints, the amount of state support for a given enterprise is not
fixed a priori or subject to pre-existing rules, but is fixed ex post depending on
the loss that would otherwise be incurred by the enterprise. For example, arrears
on tax liabilities to the state may be allowed to accumulate, directed credit may
be provided by the central bank on an ad hoc basis as the financial position of
enterprises in a particular sector deteriorates, or direct subsidies may be granted
in highly discretionary ways to pay for past losses. The persistence of soft
budget constraints in the CIS countries is epitomized by the fact that so far very
few enterprises (if any) have been allowed to go bankrupt.
3
3
The "hardening" of budget constraints will require continuing reforms in
economic institutions as well as increasing transparency of and reductions in
direct and indirect subsidies. Foremost in institutional reforms is privatization.
Here, progress has varied widely across CIS countries and, within countries,
across economic sectors. Retail trade enterprises and small and medium-sized
enterprises were typically among the first to be privatized. In Russia,
3
3 Strategies for economic transformation in the presence of soft budget constraints are
discussed by Liicke (1993).50
considerable progress has also been made with the conversion of large-scale
enterprises into joint-stock companies and the transfer of shares to management,
employees, and the general population through the voucher privatization
scheme. By contrast, privatization in Belarus has hardly begun and is currently
stuck as very few enterprises are offered for sale and private sector development
is generally discouraged through intensified state controls on private
enterprises. Although the WTO agreements do not prescribe any particular
ownership pattern for enterprises, the incumbent WTO members can be
expected to scrutinize progress in privatization as a primary indicator of
progress in the transformation of economic institutions generally.
Apart from issues of ownership and corporate governance, state involvement in
the CIS economies also takes the form of direct administrative measures.
Initially, after the disintegration of the central planning system, a wide variety
of administrative controls were introduced at the national, regional, and local
levels in an attempt to ensure a sufficient supply of essential consumer goods
and intermediate products, to hold down retail and wholesale prices, and to
protect local producers. Minimum and maximum prices, upper limits on profit
margins, regional export quotas, and buy-local requirements are illustrative
examples. By the end of 1996, most administrative controls in Russia, at least,
appear to have been formally abolished. Nevertheless, there remains a lack of51
transparency as to the effective determinants of, for example, relative prices of
imported vs. domestically produced goods at the retail level.
One area where considerable progress has been made in all CIS countries is the
reduction of state orders to enterprises. CIS governments had used these to
ensure a sufficient supply of goods to local distribution systems and to fulfil
obligations incurred through bilateral trade agreements with other CIS
countries.
3
4 In some countries, state trading enterprises still account for a
significant share of certain raw material exports to non-CIS countries. These are
frequently natural resources where supply is concentrated in a limited number of
deposits and traditional marketing channels continue to function. A special
licence is sometimes required for exporting particular commodities, for example
for energy materials in Russia (cf. Section 3.1). It seems safe to state that such
controls typically aim at alleviating principal-agent-type problems faced by the
state as creditor of tax liabilities and owner of natural resource rents,
3
5 rather
than at permitting governments to interfere in the operation of enterprises.
Accession to the WTO will require the gradual abolition of administrative
3
4 State orders are therefore distinguished from government procurement which relates only
to goods destined for government consumption.
3
5 Resource rents are defined as the scarcity value of natural resources, which is roughly the
difference between world market price and extraction cost. Taxes on resource production
or exports allow the state to capture some of the resource rent.52
controls at the national, regional, and local levels as progress is made in
hardening budget constraints, reforming the tax system, and replacing maximum
prices for essential consumer goods with targeted transfers.
With respect to direct and indirect subsidies, the major problem at present
appears to be the lack of transparency. Both direct budgetary payments and
indirect subsidies, e.g. through directed credit from central banks at artificially
low interest rates, are limited through agreements with the Internationa]
Monetary Fund at least in Russia and Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is still difficult
to gain an understanding of the underlying regulations, the amounts involved, or
the recipients. Incumbent WTO members can be expected to require acceding
CIS countries to increase the transparency of their subsidy systems so that
compliance with the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures can be effectively verified. Beyond transparency, the phasing out of
subsidies according to the timetables agreed with the IMF, which tend to be
ambitious, should represent sufficient progress towards the hardening of budget
constraints.
6 Benefits of WTO Accession for the CIS Countries
As the former Soviet Union was not a contracting party to GATT 1947, the
trade policies of partner countries were not subject to GATT discipline. As a
result, the former Soviet Union faced higher tariffs and more extensive non-53
tariff barriers than other country groups for extended periods. This situation
improved when most major OECD countries concluded MFN agreements with
the Soviet Union since the 1970s. MFN status was transferred to the CIS
countries in 1992 and 1993, and they were frequently included in OECD.
country General Systems of Preferences (GSP) that had previously benefited
almost exclusively developing countries.
3
6 In order to maintain this position, the
CIS countries will be expected to show further progress in systemic
transformation, culminating in WTO membership. Only then will their trading
partners be fully bound by mutual obligations to respect WTO rules, including
those on anti-dumping and safeguards.
3
7
In the case of the European Union, MFN treatment and participation in the GSP
were first granted by the EU on a provisional basis. They will become
permanent as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between the EU and
3
6 A detailed description of the changes in OECD country trade policies towards the CIS
countries is provided by Michalopoulos and Tarr (1994) and OECD (1994), pp. 6Iff.
3
7 Some residual elements of the trade regime formerly applied to imports from the Soviet
Union persist: selective (bilateral) safeguard clauses seek to prevent injury to domestic
producers by restricting imports only from certain transition economies (outside the WTO);
anti-dumping measures may be based on prices in third countries with market economies or
even on domestic prices in importing countries, rather than actual prices in the exporting
transition economy.54
the individual CIS countries are ratified.
3
8 Nevertheless, EU tariffs on imports
from the CIS are still higher than for other important third countries with more
generous preference schemes, for instance EFTA, Visegrad and Baltic countries
(Europe Agreements). This may change if and when negotiations start in several
years' time on free trade agreements between the EU and the individual CIS
countries as foreseen by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.
However, any move towards closer regional integration along these lines would
be politically feasible only if the CIS countries accede to the WTO first. WTO
membership would also be a precondition for regional integration with the East
3
8 The texts of these agreements may be found in: Vorschlag fur cinen BeschluB des Rates
und der Kommission liber den AbschluB des Abkommens iiber Partnerschaft und
Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Europaischen Gemeinschaflen und ihren Mitgliedstaaten
einerseits und der Russischen Foderation andererseits (von der Kommission vorgelegt).
Luxemburg: Arm fur Amtliche Veroff. der Europ. Gemeinschaften, 1994 (KOM; 94,257
endg.); Europaische Kommission: Vorschlag filr einen BeschluB des Rates und der
Kommission iiber den AbschluB des Abkommens iiber Partnerschaft und Zusammenarbeit
zwischen den Europaischen Gemeinschaften und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der
Ukraine andererseits (von der Kommission vorgelegt). Luxemburg: Amt fur Amtliche
Veroff. der Europ. Gemeinschaften, 1994 (KOM; 94,226 endg.); Europaische Kommission.
Vorschlag fur einen BeschluB des Rates und der Kommission iiber den AbschluB des
Abkommens iiber Partnerschaft und Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Europaischen
Gemeinschaften und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der Republik WeifiruBland
andererseits. - Luxemburg: Amt fiir Amtliche Veroff. der Europ. Gemeinschaften, 1995
(KOM; 95,44 endg.).55
European countries, for example through membership in an extended Central
European Free Trade Area (CEFTA).
In sum, accession to the WTO will not confer many short-term benefits to the
CIS countries in terms of improved market access. It is a necessary condition,
however, for consolidating the gains made in recent years on account of the
stated commitment of the CIS countries to systemic transformation. Failure to
accede to the WTO, possibly because of lack of progress on systemic
transformation, would call recent improvements in market access into question.
Furthermore, the recent literature on the political economy of policy reforms
emphasizes the importance of government credibility for the ultimate success of
a reform programme. International commitments entered into by a government,
such as those involved in accession to the WTO, may enhance credibility as
they raise the cost to the government of deviating from its stated policy path
(Rodrik, 1989). WTO accession will require the CIS countries to commit to-
further reform in several crucial fields:
First,'a pervasive problem is the lack of transparency in many regulations which
raises uncertainty about the payoff from economic decisions and may ultimately
even undermine the rule of law. During accession negotiations, legal texts
pertaining to a wide variety of policy areas will be scrutinized by incumbent
WTO members. In many instances, for example in the area of intellectual56
property rights, the emphasis will be less on the letter of law than on
establishing judicial procedures for the actual enforcement of rules. This will
require far-reaching reforms in the judicial system.
Second, systemic reform will be closely monitored by incumbent WTO
members, and CIS countries may be asked to make specific commitments on
progress in particular areas. In particular, de-statisation and privatisation of
internal trade at the wholesale and retail levels, privatisation of small and
medium-sized enterprises, and gradual privatisation of large enterprises are
conceivable stepping stones. Financial discipline on the part of enterprises
needs to be tightened through continuing institutional changes like
implementation of bankruptcy procedures and through reductions in direct and
indirect subsidies.
Third, accession to the WTO will require the CIS countries to take policy
decisions that they have avoided so far, for example with respect to the strategic
objectives of trade policy. The precise form of regional integration will be of
particular importance as it will become apparent whether Russia can be moved
to extend the benefit of low domestic energy prices to net energy importers
among the CIS countries. Furthermore, the CIS governments will have their
autonomy over some policy parameters reduced, for example when import and
export tariffs are bound. Accession to the WTO can thus provide a focal point57
for policy decisions that would have to be taken at any rate sooner or later, but
have now to be dealt with simultaneously, under scrutiny from incumbent WTO
members, and under an obligation to bind .policy parameters with little chance.
of future changes. This is likely to enhance the consistency of the decisions
taken. In the short to medium run, the impetus to further market-oriented
systemic reform through enhanced credibility of governments may well be the
most important benefit of WTO accession.
7 Implications of the Accession of CIS Countries for the Multilateral
Trading System
With the transition from GATT 1947 to the WTO, the multilateral trading
system has undergone far-reaching change. On the one hand, the interpretation
of many provisions of GATT 1947 was clarified and tightened in the
multilateral agreements on trade in goods and in the Understandings on various
GATT articles that became part of GATT 1994 (Annex 1 to the WTO
Agreement). On the other hand, a variety of new issues were brought into the
scope of the WTO. The protection of trade-related intellectual property rights,
both with respect to definition and enforcement, is covered quite exhaustively in
the TRIPS Agreement. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
lays down general rules for the regulation of trade in services which are to be
supplemented by more specific rules and liberalisation commitments in selected58
service sectors. Negotiations have started on financial and professional services,
maritime transport, basic telecommunications, as well as on the movement of
natural persons as one important mode of supply in international trade in
services. Furthermore,' discussions are taking place on the possible role of the
WTO with respect to the social and environmental implications of trade,
investment policy, and competition policy.
At the same time that the scope of the WTO is being extended, the membership
applications by the CIS countries, most importantly Russia, along with China,
Taiwan, and several others, provide an opportunity for bringing all the world's
major trading countries into the multilateral trading system. However, in the
CIS countries, the legacy of the central planning system and the uncertainties
afflicting the transformation of the economic, political and social systems raise
serious problems in terms of the transparency of policies and time requirements
for the necessary adjustments. While this is true for many traditional GATT
concerns, it applies a fortiori to the new WTO areas, especially trade in services
where policies in the accession countries (like in many other countries) are still
ill-defined.
It has been argued in this article that the accession of the CIS countries to the
WTO, beyond consolidating recent improvements in market access, will lend
credibility to the process of systemic transformation itself and will thereby help59
to stabilize it. Not only the CIS countries, but also incumbent WTO members
have a high stake in the success of systemic transformation, both in economic
and in political terms. Provided that the CIS countries make demonstrable
progress in increasing the transparency of their trade-related policies and
bringing them into compliance with WTO rules, incumbent WTO members
should accord high priority to a speedy accession of the CIS countries to the
WTO.
3
9 Accordingly, they should refrain from pushing acceding countries to
commit themselves to more stringently liberal policies than incumbent WTO
members themselves accepted as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements. In
the interest of speedy accession, it would also be appropriate to extend the
benefit of already established adjustment periods fully to new WTO members,
such as for the phasing out of prohibited subsidies by transition economies
(SCM Agreement). All this would strengthen the traditional function of the
multilateral trading system as a set of basic rules for global free trade which can
3
9 It is not especially encouraging that during the Singapore Ministerial Conference in
December 1996, accession issues played only a minor role in spite of the deadlock in
negotiations with China where the positions of incumbent WTO members differed
significantly. Furthermore, the wording of the very brief Section 8;.of the Ministerial
Declaration places responsibility for progress with accession rather single-handedly on the
applicants by calling on them to "accept... the WTO rules" and "offer... meaningful market
access commitments".60
be supplemented, but never replaced by other forms of bilateral or plurilateral
cooperation or economic integration.
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